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The Usefulness of Social Capital in Assessing the 
Welfare Effects of Private and Third-Party Certification Food Safety Policy Standards: 
Trust and Networks 
 
Research paper 
 
Purpose – The aim is to assess the welfare effects of the newest trends in food safety policies 
characterized by the shift from public to private intervention.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – food safety policies are analysed through concepts of new 
economic sociology, with a critical review of the literature on social capital. 
 
Findings – The article shows that as food safety and quality attributes responsible for the 
exchange complexity are simply codified and enforced through standards and third-party 
certification, the global value chain governance shifts from a relational type to a power-based 
type, with possible negative welfare effects. 
 
Research limitations – Further research would be required to verify the welfare effects 
suggested on the theoretical ground. 
 
Practical implications – The article makes a useful updating of food safety policies and 
organizational innovation in the food system. 
 
 3 
Originality/value of the paper – The paper introduces to some new (with respect to the 
marketing literature related to the food system) concepts and theories of economic sociology. 
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Introduction 
 
This article contends that the current shift from public to private food safety standards and 
third party certification calls for a different approach to the analysis of food safety policies, 
on both descriptive and normative grounds. Stemming from two different concepts of social 
capital, one of trust and the other of networks, the article demonstrates how both are useful in 
assessing the welfare effects of the newest trends in food safety policies. The attention given 
to the dimension of social capital is but the starting point from which to apply methods and 
concepts of the new economic sociology to the study of global agri-food systems, in order to 
overcome the many shortcomings of the standard economic model. 
 
The remaining parts of the article are organized as follows. Drawing on the theoretical and 
empirical literature, first described is the ongoing shift from public to private food safety 
standards and third party certification. Subsequently, two different concepts of social capital 
are introduced: trust and networks. These notions of social capital are then applied to the 
analysis of the welfare effects of private food safety standards and third party certification. 
The article concludes with thoughts and suggestions concerning some approaches of 
economic sociology that could be integrated in the research agenda of scholars engaged in the 
study of global agri-food systems. 
 
From Public to Private Food Safety Standards 
 
Recent trends in food safety policies 
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In Western developed countries the issue of food safety has traditionally been addressed by 
national health bodies and laws (Henson, Caswell, 1999; Henson, 2001). The tools widely 
used to protect citizens from eating unsafe foods have included the following three: first, the 
circulation of guidelines and information to improve the hygiene during the process of 
production, distribution, and home handling of food; second, the setting of standards limiting 
the content of chemical, biological, and physical contamination of food; and, third, a tort 
liability legislation and other laws to enforce food standards. With the emergence of wealthier 
and more conscious consumers, however, private firms have improved their involvement in 
food safety activities as well by using different tools such as certification and quality 
assurance programs, quality disclosures, and investments in reputation (Holleran et al., 1999).  
At the beginning of the 1990s, two forces promoted contradictory changes in the system. 
First, the creation of the World Trade Organization as a multinational body entrusted with the 
task of trade liberalization raised a request for non-tariff trade barrier reductions and standard 
harmonization in order to facilitate trade (Caswell, 2003). Second, with outbreaks of food 
diseases, such as BSE, SARS, and avian influenza, new safety concerns were raised by the 
public, and a request was made for more state control and assurance. The result has been, on 
one hand, a higher effort of nation states in promoting and coordinating food safety at a 
national and international level, and, on the other hand, research into new tools of 
intervention (e.g., hazard analysis and critical control point- HACCP, traceability, and 
certification) that are less rigid than the classical mandatory minimum standards; in order to 
achieve the double goals of reducing the disclaims of trade partners with lower levels of 
standards and of better dealing with new health threats associated with the growing 
dimension and complexity of global agri-food systems.  
 
 6 
Food safety policy in the European Union is supported by the following three pillars. First, 
the General Food Safety Law (see note 1) lays down the general principles and requirements 
of food law and procedures in matters of food safety, establishes the European Food Safety 
Authority, and instigates mandatory food traceability. Second, the directives and their 
following updating provisions set standards for dangerous contents (e.g., additives, residues, 
and chemicals), labeling, and hygiene practices (HACCP). Third, the different laws that give 
the private certification system the ultimate state guarantee through public institutions' 
certification bodies' accreditation.  
 
Along with this food safety policy framework are the national food safety systems and the 
international regulatory guidelines set forth by the World Trade Organization and other 
bodies. These systems and guidelines are discussed next. 
 
National food safety systems differ from one another because of differences in the national 
laws implementing the EU directives or because of the different enforcement tools offered by 
the individual nation legal systems (see note 2). Furthermore, even inside a single member 
state there can be differences among regions due to the ongoing processes of devolution 
partially related to budgetary state constraints.  
 
The World Trade Organization addresses the food safety issue mainly with the sanitary and 
phytosanitary agreement and the technical barriers to trade agreement. The former agreement, 
while stating the rights of individual states to carry out any measure deemed necessary to 
achieve health and food safety goals, spells out the condition under which sanitary and 
phytosanitary issues could be used to limit trade in a given food product. Notable is the 
appeal to science in making such determinations and the stress on international standards 
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setting bodies, including the Codex Alimentarius, thereby giving such previously voluntary 
organizations de facto mandatory status. The latter agreement limits food safety interventions 
to those that are deemed not to be used for blocking trade. In order to assess the necessity 
(instead of a technical barrier use) of an intervention, much attention is given to processes of 
risk analysis (based on strict science-based procedures) aimed at defining the appropriate 
level of protection consistent with a fair trade practice. 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization are mainly 
concerned with the difficulties that less developed countries face when trying either to lower 
the domestic food risk or to update their goods to the safety standards of importer countries. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization is currently engaged in projects aimed at improving 
agricultural extension and training in order to help farmers cope with the changing 
contractual arrangements set out by importers (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2005a, 
2005b). The World Health Organization has recently recognized food safety as a public 
health problem and has designed its role in food safety as "to reduce the burden of food borne 
illness by advising and assisting Member States how to reduce exposure to unacceptable 
levels of chemicals or micro organisms in food" (World Health Organization, 2002: p. 10). 
According to this mandate, seven approaches are referred to within the World Health 
Organization (2002) global strategy for food safety. These approaches are: strengthening 
surveillance systems of food borne disease; improving risk assessment; developing methods 
for assessing the safety of new technologies; enhancing the scientific and public health role of 
WHO in Codex Commission; enhancing risk communication and advocacy; improving 
international and national cooperation; and strengthening capacity building in developing 
countries. Table 1 summarizes the different levels of food safety regulation in the European 
Union and the role of international bodies and agencies. 
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Insert Table 1 about Here 
 
Private food safety standards and third-party certification 
 
Food safety tools can be divided broadly into two groups (Sodano, Verneau, 2004): first, 
public and mandatory, legally enforced (see note 3) and, second, private and voluntary, either 
legally or informally enforced (Table 2). The most widely used tools in the first group include 
minimum standards, such as those referring to pesticide residues, additives, chemical, and 
microbiological contaminants; mandatory hazard and critical control point; tort liability; 
mandatory traceability; and labeling (Caswell, Padberg, 1992). Tools in the second group 
include voluntary certification with a third-party certification, using legally enforced formal 
contracts; voluntary certification without a third-party certification, using quasi-formal and 
informal contracts; voluntary hazard and critical control point, traceability and standard, 
using formal and informal contracts; and reputation, using informal implicit contracts 
(Furubotn , Richter, 2000; Shapiro, 1983). 
 
Insert Table 2 about Here 
 
The use of these different tools has dramatically changed in strength and scope over the past 
decade. The World Trade Organization's growing power and the ongoing process of 
deregulation and devolution of the state has pushed towards the withdrawal of the state from 
standard setting and auditing intervention. Meanwhile, the higher environmental, health, and 
social risks associated with the geographic spread of food markets and new technologies have 
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caused an increase of new social movements asking for greater food-chain control and 
guarantee (USAID, 2005).  
 
As a result of the above changes there has been a shift from public to private food safety 
standards, and among these from first-party certification to third-party certification. The 
ultimate leading part of this process has been the retail sector. The construction of private 
standard (built on state standard, defined by a single firm, by an industry group, or by a third-
party) offers supermarkets at least the following three opportunities. First, to achieve 
competitive advantages through a non-price competition based on product differentiation and 
reputation enhancement; second, to reduce transaction costs by facilitating procurement 
activities, especially when carried out in a context of global sourcing; and third, to pre-empt 
state and other actor interventions that might be dysfunctional to their own internal resources 
and organization. Substituting for missing public institutions also offers an opportunity for 
food retailers (Henson and Reardon, 2005). Examining the main economic and institutional 
incentives, which have driven major food retailers in their use of private voluntary standards, 
a primary driver has been reputation (Fulponi, 2006: p 6): "Providing consumers with 
products that meet consistent quality and safety standards that go beyond the minimum 
requirement is seen as essential to building reputation, the key asset for current and earnings 
flows". 
 
Currently, a vast array of certifications operates in global food systems around the world, 
covering just about every aspect of food production, processing, transportation, and retailing. 
A recent USAID report (2005) identifies the following types of certifications, including some 
quasi-mandatory certification where the state acts as third-party certifier: strict food safety 
certifications (HACCP, ISO 9000, and ISO 14000; traceability; region-of-origin labeling; 
 10 
organic certification; export certifications; fair trade; labour certifications; ethical trade 
initiative; EUREP; environmental certifications; phytosanitary certifications; corporate social 
responsibility; animal welfare; and non-genetically modified certification. 
 
As already mentioned, not only has there been a shift from public to private food safety 
standards, but among these private ones there has been a shift from first (i.e., audited by 
suppliers) and second (i.e., audited by retailers' paid technicians) parties to third-party 
certification (i.e., audited by a third party independent from other actors in the food system). 
With respect to first and second parties, third-party certification has two important 
advantages for retailers (Hatanaka et al., 2005). First, retailer organizational responsibility 
and liability is transferred to third-party certifiers, with third-party certification strengthening 
a possible 'due diligence' defence. For example, in the United Kingdom the due diligence 
defense introduced by the Food Safety Act 1990 in lieu of the so-called 'warranty defence' 
(see note 4) has been quoted as an important driver in the wide use of third-party certification 
by retailers (Hobbs et al., 2002). Second, the cost of monitoring and assuring food safety and 
quality is passed to suppliers, while benefits to reputation remaining mainly with retailers. 
 
Currently, major retailers in developed countries have their own agrifood standards. As 
processes of globalization and concentration at retail level accelerate, inter-retailer 
collaboration grows, with different chains establishing common standards (e.g., EUREPGAP, 
CIES's Global Food Safety Initiative, and British Retail Consortium) and using third-party 
certification firms that operate globally (e.g., Primus Lab, Cert ID, and Davis Fresh 
Technologies). Moreover, retailers are increasing their collaboration with a wide range of 
public and private initiatives and with non-governmental organizations involved in food 
programs (Bush, Thiagarajan, Bain, 2005). The result is a new food-safety network with 
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central nodes being made of huge retailers and third-party certification companies; secondary 
nodes made of non-governmental organizations, civil consortium, extension agencies, and 
local governmental agencies, and with suppliers around the world insulated in peripherical 
positions. 
 
While benefits and opportunities of private standard and third-party certification are well 
expressed by the above mentioned incentives that have moved retailers towards these 
policies, costs and threats have not been clearly assessed yet. Current literature highlights at 
least five concerns constituting the down side of third-party certification. These concerns are 
as follows. 
 
Cost bearing and sharing. With the exception of fair trade certification, which is generally 
paid by the buyer or exporter, costs of certification are borne by producers. Small farms that 
cannot afford the costs exit the market (Henson, Masakure, and Boselie, 2005). In developing 
countries, smallholders without title to land (women are often in that condition) incur 
difficulties also in carrying out the specific investments needed for certification. Put simply, 
"standards demanded by supermarkets are a powerful driver of concentration, and the 
corresponding exclusion of small farmers" (Balsevich et al., 2003). Furthermore, certification 
and associated costs appear not to be compensated for in price premiums received for the 
product, through better management of the farm or firm, or through increased sales, with the 
exclusion of fair trade standard (Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005). 
 
Democratic governance. Private standards and third-party certification might be intrinsically 
deemed to be non-democratic mainly because of three features. First, the emergence of a 
standard comes from the decision of a single firm or non-governmental organization, without 
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any formal statutory consulting with those affected by the decision. Second, the threshold of 
the standard is an arbitrary choice. While standard-makers justify their choices as science-
based, it should be recognized that "science alone is incapable of telling us what risks are 
worth taking" (Bush et al., 2005: p. 39). Such a decision implies judgement of value and 
should rely on political debates and accepted wisdom. Third, the use of private standards 
exacerbates power imbalance within the food system, with retailers gaining more advantages 
with respect to producers (Hatanaka, Bain, and Bush, 2005). 
 
Less developed countries upgrading. The raising of private standards and third-party 
certification offers challenges and opportunities for development (Reardon and Berdegue, 
2002). While some studies suggest that, in order to comply with standards for export product, 
less developed countries accelerate processes of agricultural innovation and domestic food 
safety improvement (Fulponi, 2006), others suggest that the effort to raise performance for 
export markets negatively affects quality and safety of locally sold products, with low 
quality-low cost farmers becoming 'segregated' in the domestic market (Hatanaka, Bain, and 
Bush, 2005).  
 
Efficacy and reliability of certification systems. In third-party certification schemas, agency 
auditing compliance with standards must be accredited by a third-party certification 
accreditor that in turn must be 'certified' by a Certification Body. Such certification bodies 
must themselves undergo audits to ensure that they have the necessary systems and processes. 
Certification bodies come in many shapes and forms; they may be private or public, a non-
governmental organization, or a commercial firm: "CBs and TBC accreditors tend to engage 
in a complex surveillance system, auditing and accrediting one another in multiple tiers to 
various standards. ISO/IEC Guides tend to be used as guidelines by CBs and TBC accreditors 
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in auditing and accrediting themselves" (Bush et al., 2005: p. 8). Each nation has its own ISO 
accreditation organization. While certification bodies generally claim their independence and 
that their services are objective, consistent, transparent, and effective, three evidences 
contrast these claims (Bush et al., 2005). First, the certification bodies are themselves in the 
marketplace, the certification market. Second, many certifications are likely to remain limited 
to credence attributes (e.g., pesticide residues, organic production practices, fair trade, social 
accountability) because for these attributes no failure to perform adequate certification is ever 
likely to become directly evident to either buyers or consumers. Third, since certification 
does not necessarily mean that best practices are being followed, rather it means that a paper 
trail has been produced, which again means that fraud is possible as in any other industry. 
 
Compliance with World Trade Organization agreements. Since they are voluntary, 
certification schemes are outside the control of the World Trade Organization. Nevertheless, 
when supported by the leading global actors in the food supply system, they become in effect 
mandatory and can give rise to litigation with respect to the terms of the technical-barriers-to-
trade agreement, by arguing that "at some level all standards are technical barriers to trade" 
(Bush et al., 2005: p. 35). 
 
Social Capital: Definition, Concepts, and Applications 
 
Definition 
 
Social capital has been defined as "social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity" 
(Putnam and Gross, 2002: p. 8). The idea underlining this definition, from nearly all the 
literature on social capital is that "dense networks of social interaction appear to foster sturdy 
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norms of generalized reciprocity.  In other terms social interaction helps to resolve dilemmas 
of collective action, encouraging people to act in a trustworthy way when they might not 
otherwise do so" (Putnam and Gross, 2002: p. 7). Although the term 'social capital' is often 
related to both the concept of trust-based social norms and of networks, a distinction can be 
made between two strands of literature depending on which concept is considered as 
prevalent (Figure 1). These strands are considered next. 
 
Insert Figure 1 around Here 
 
Concepts 
 
Trust. The first strand is related to Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) regarding the role of 
social capital in improving democracy and economic development. Social capital is viewed 
as a kind of impersonal and generalized trust. Impersonal is different from interpersonal trust. 
Impersonal trust is at least an individual's optimistic expectation about the outcome of an 
event and it explains social structure; it can be considered as "a set of social expectations 
shared by everyone involved in an economic exchange" (Zucker, 1986). Interpersonal trust 
occurs in contexts of relationship settings where two actors are involved in an exchange and 
is defined as "the extent to which a person is confident in, and willing to act on the basis of, 
the words, actions, and decisions of another" (McAllister, 1995).  
 
Impersonal trust is social and normative, while interpersonal trust is essentially individual 
and calculative. Following Gintis (2000), impersonal trust is consistent with a definition of 
social actor as homo reiprocans and/or homo egualis, while interpersonal trust fits the classic 
definition of homo economicus. Impersonal trust does not exist without the existence of prior 
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social relationships, which are able to drive social actors towards cooperative behavioural 
patterns. Impersonal trust reinforces social relationships, building up, along with other kinds 
of social norms, those social networks constituting the structure of civil society. As 
impersonal trust, social capital fosters democracy and economic development by facilitating 
social and economic exchanges (reducing monitoring and sanctioning cost) and allowing 
dilemmas of collective action to be resolved (limiting free-riding and offering cooperative-
based solutions to collective action problems). According to this definition, social capital is 
measured mainly through the dimensions of associability, trust, and attention (Offe and 
Fuchs, 2002). Indirectly related to this strand of literature are economic theories (Bowles, 
2004; Fher and Gachter, 2000; Fher and Schmidt, 2001) that stress the role of reciprocal 
behaviour, social preferences, and social norms in resolving organizational problems 
associated with contract incompleteness and in explaining experimental results of bargaining 
games.  
 
Networks. The second strand is related to works by Burt (1992, 2005) and Lin (2001) on 
social structure. Here social capital is defined as "resources embedded in a social structure 
that are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions" (Lin, 2001: p. 29), where the social 
structure refers to relationships (that are the frame of a network) among social actors. 
Accordingly, networks are themselves considered as a form of social capital. Linkages with 
other actors constitute the network of an actor, which is his social capital, whose value 
depends on the structure of the networks, the resources contacts hold, and the nature of 
relationships (Burt, 1992).  
 
Following the above definition, social capital is not necessarily associated with cooperative 
behaviour and high level of trust, but rather it nourishes competitive behaviour based on the 
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exploitation of information and control opportunities offered to an actor by his endowment of 
social capital. Related to this strand of literature is the theory of social exchange and mainly 
the power-dependence theory in both its strictly structural (Cook and Emerson, 1978) and 
structural strategic (Molm, 1997) version.  
 
Applications 
 
Neo-institutional theories. The trust perspective has been used in neo-institutional theories 
when studying trust and social norms as alternative exchange organizational forms with 
respect to markets, contracts, and hierarchies. Trust, in a sense, completes the theory of 
transaction cost, allowing for another aspect of human behaviour (attitude toward cooperation 
or trusting behavior) that gives rise to control structures (informal relationships, such as 
'handshakes') that are alternatives to the contractual line, which defines the continuum 
between markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1985; Furubton, Richter, 2000). From this 
point of view, social capital (as trust) is deemed to be welfare enhancing, by lowering 
transaction costs and correcting market failures due to asymmetric information, uncertainty, 
and public goods. 
 
Development theories. Both the trust and the network feature of social capital have been 
considered by development economists who have found sound evidence that a positive 
relation exists between social capital endowment (measured through associability and 
attitudes towards trust and reciprocity; see Grootaeri et al., 2004) and the level of social and 
economic development. Nevertheless, the related literature also distinguishes between forms 
of social capital enhancing welfare and equity and forms that are detrimental to democracy 
and development. As an example, a distinction is made between inward-looking versus 
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outward-looking social capital and between bridging versus bonding social capital (Putnam 
and Gross, 2002). Inward-looking forms of social capital (e.g., a gentlemen's club or 
chambers of commerce) tend to promote the material, social, and political interests of their 
own members, even at the expense of outsiders, while outward-looking forms (e.g., civil 
rights movements) are concerned mainly with the public interest and provide clear public as 
well as personal benefits. Bonding social capital, on the one hand, brings together people who 
are like one another in important respect (social class, gender, and race) and can be conducive 
of conflicts and inequalities. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, brings together people 
who are unlike one another and is more likely to promote cooperation and equality.  
 
Management and industrial organization theories. Looking mainly at the network 
perspective, management and industrial organization scholars have considered social capital 
as a source of competitive advantage (see note 5). These scholars are generally enthusiastic 
about the benefits of networks, including facilitating communication and allowing for flexible 
organizational arrangements, fostering the ability to seize new market opportunities, and 
creating a more innovation-oriented business atmosphere. Despite these claims, it would be 
hazardous to consider networks as always enhancing economic welfare. In fact, it is not the 
total amount of connections that matters, but the kind of connection and the particular shape 
of the network structure that it generates. There really exists a flip side of the coin, a kind of 
'dark side' of social capital that can hamper  instead of improve  economic welfare in 
respect of both efficiency and equity concerns. 
 
The relation between social capital in the form of network and firm strategies in the 
competitive arena has been addressed by Burt (1992, 2005) by means of the structural holes 
theory. The following section considers this theory. 
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The structural holes theory 
 
At the core of Burt's theory is the claim that "competition works when players have 
established relations with others" (Burt, 1992: p. 1), that is when the competitive arena is 
investigated as a network whose nodes are the players in the competition game. Network 
structure is responsible for differences in competitive advantage among the players, with 
structural holes, defined as disconnections or nonequivalencies between players, being the 
core structural element, "Variable exposure to structural holes is the foundation for network 
models of social capital and a fulcrum for comparing models" (Burt, 2005: p. 16). 
Asymmetry in the social capital endowment by actors and the structurally induced 
consequences of this asymmetry on their market opportunities (also in the form of exercising 
market and bargaining power) is the very cause of high performance associated with 
structural holes. 
 
Besides being provided with a network rich in structural holes, an actor (an individual or 
organization) can strengthen his social capital by brokerage, for example by bridging the 
holes (Burt, 2005). When an actor (a broker) provides bridges across structural holes (e.g., a 
manager who creates interdivisional links in a large organization), combining information 
from disparate groups that would not otherwise communicate, he relocates himself in a better 
position. Returns to brokerage are constrained by the maintenance of a certain degree of 
network closure, which is the strength and exclusivity of relationships within groups. 
Brokerage, together with closure, makes the network assume the typical small world 
structure, that is a bundle of dense clusters (characterized by closure, for example by strong 
ties among actors, generally supported by self-enforcing relationships including trust, 
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reputation, and social norms) separated by structural holes, and weak ties (the bridges 
provided by brokers) linking structural holes. In such a small world structure brokers are the 
more powerful actors, with more chances to seize opportunities and a higher bargaining 
power to spend within relationships with other actors. Information advantages and the various 
exchange opportunities (and consequently the low exchange dependence) are the main 
sources of gains from brokerage.  
 
While the positive effects on firm profits of such an endowment of social capital (depicted as 
a network rich with structural holes and brokerage opportunities) are highlighted in Burt 
(1992, 2005), different benefits assessments can be made when looking at the issue from the 
point of view of total welfare effects. Because a firm's competitive advantages stem from 
market imperfection due to incomplete and asymmetric information, and because some form 
of market power is exercised, conditions of Pareto optimality are not fulfilled and efficiency 
is not guaranteed. Moreover, because some form of bargaining power is exercised, there are 
equity concerns as well. In other words, the 'dark side' of social capital is associated here with 
market failures and inequalities stemming from market imperfection, information asymmetry 
and incompleteness, opportunistic behaviours, and imbalance of power.  
 
Assessment of the Welfare Effects of Non-Public Standards 
 
Private standards and third-party certification augment the total amount of social capital in 
the food system, considering both trust and network dimensions. First, trust increases either 
because of the higher transparency associated with standards, or because of consumers' 
greater confidence in third instead of first and second party certification. Second, networks 
grow due to the new procurement systems, and to the civil society involvement associated 
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with the process of standard setting. The new procurement system is characterized by a 
centralized supply system that relies on specialized/dedicated wholesalers and preferred 
suppliers operating under de facto contracts. Such a system substitutes the previous 
decentralized one, relying on traditional wholesalers and spot markets (Henson and Reardon, 
2005), and making use of short-period weak contracts. The result is a higher degree of 
connection with more formal relationships among actors in the food supply system. The civil 
society involvement is explained by the fact that social movements (in the forms of non-
governmental organizations and consumer activists) have played an important role in 
influencing both the adoption and the content of third-party certification, and have been, as 
already mentioned, one of the driving forces in the new food safety policy trends. 
 
Taking for granted that the total amount of social capital is positively related to economic and 
social development, private standards and third-party certification seem able to foster a safer 
and more efficient global food system. Nevertheless, using more carefully the different 
categories of social capital introduced in the previous section, their welfare effects are more 
dubious and contradictory. 
 
How Much Trust? 
 
Regarding trust, at least two contradictory effects of third-party certification can be accounted 
for. First, the erosion of trust as an effective corrective tool of contract incompleteness. 
Second, the excess of consumer trust and the social misunderstanding of actual health risk, 
especially with regard to processes of risk assessment of new technologies. Each of these two 
contradictory effects is considered next. 
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Contract incompleteness and trust. Many food quality and safety attributes are experience 
and credence attributes, for which some form of guarantee is required by the buyer (Sodano, 
2001). When monitoring costs are low and the external legal system is effective, formal 
guarantee contracts are viable. When monitoring costs are excessive and/or the external legal 
system is ineffective, informal contract based on reputation or trust is needed (Sodano, 2002). 
The role of trust as a corrective tool of contract incompleteness has been widely described in 
the organizational literature, mainly from an institutional perspective. In a wide sense, trust 
shifts the organizational analysis from contracts (as elementary analysis units) to a 
multidimensional spectrum of possible quasi-formal trading relationships of the kind of 
obligation-contractual relations. Such relationships are strongly embedded in social relations 
between trading partners, and are characterized by a sense of mutual trust (Schary and Skjott-
Larsen, 2001). These kinds of relations, and the related relational marketing strategies, are the 
ones that assured retailers' quality and safety standards before the spreading of third-party 
certification.  
 
During the 1990s, in order to face consumers' concerns about food quality and safety, 
manufacturers and retailers have engaged in quality programs based on private standards with 
first- and second-party certification and on internal quality systems. The effectiveness of such 
a policy relied strongly on the edification of local networks of suppliers linked to the buyer 
through direct contacts and acquaintance, with buyer-seller relationships built around a high 
level of impersonal trust, in the form of value sharing and attitudes towards reciprocity. The 
high level of commitment stemmed from 'ethical' more than legal constraints. Typically, this 
kind of relationship was able to assure the compliance with standards also in situations of 
contract incompleteness associated with credence attributes and low formal enforcement 
mechanisms.  
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Since then, however, private safety and quality polices have change as the result of the new 
established procurement system organization, linked to the process of consolidation of 
retailers and the entailed enlargement of their market geographical scope. This new system 
shows two main features. First, the geographical spread of suppliers. Second, the shift from 
fragmented, decentralized procurement to centralized supply systems, and from reliance on 
traditional wholesalers to specialized/dedicated wholesalers and preferred suppliers operating 
under de facto contracts. Along with this new procurement system, third-party certification 
has emerged as the most preferred means to support food quality and safety standards. 
 
The shift from the previous more socially embedded procurement system and from first- and 
second-party certification to the new globally dispersed (but more centrally controlled by a 
sort of 'super-middlemen') system where activities are placed in the hands of outsourced key 
intermediaries by powerful end-users (Hingley, 2005), as well as the advent of third-party 
certification has dramatically changed the level and the kind of trust in the process. Perhaps 
in some ways, total trust diminished because of the less direct and close links in the supply 
chain. Furthermore, the impersonal trust (and thus the social capital endowment) that 
nourished transparency and loyalty in local buyer-supplier relationships was substituted by 
the somehow naïve trust towards privileged actors, including certification bodies as a sort of 
a new kind of middlemen.  
 
The effect of these changes can be quite negative. First, the erosion of social capital is always 
detrimental to social and economic development. Second, as a corrective tool of the market 
failures associated with credence goods, trust as an informal contract of guarantee is more 
effective than the formal contracts of guarantee on which third-party certification is based. 
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The point here is that third-party certification does not actually solve the credence goods 
problems, but simply transforms credence into search goods. Such a 'miracle' is possible due 
to consumer benevolence and trust towards the certification bodies. As long as this trust is not 
well placed in, third-party certification is no longer effective in reducing health risks 
associated with food credence attributes. Since, as previously argued, many doubts can be 
raised regarding the reliability of certification systems, the erosion of social capital in favor 
of a this sort of blind trust is all but good news with regard to the effectiveness (and social 
welfare effects) of the new trends in food safety policy.  
 
The excess of trust and effective risk control. The current oligopolistic structure of the global 
retail food industry, with progressively fewer international firms dominating the market (for 
example, Wal-Mart, Carrefour, Royal Ahold, and Tesco), is pushing retailers toward 
differentiation strategies beyond the crude price competition performed so far (Ellickson, 
2004). Concerns for reputation and customer loyalty are today overwhelming the cost-saving 
obsession of the 1980s and the early 1990s. New strategies include market segmentation, 
addition of new products and services, private labels, and store format innovation. Private 
standards and third-party certification are central elements of this investment effort in brand 
equity and reputation. Standards with social interest, including safety, fair trade, labour, and 
corporate social responsibility standards, are particularly aimed at this end. 
 
The argument proposed here is that private standards and third-party certification can 
contribute to build a consumer trust that is excessive with respect to that needed for an 
optimal social and economic outcome. 
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The literature on the welfare effect of firms' advertising bill has stressed either positive 
effects (associated with quality improvement; or negative effects (associated with possible 
excess of market power and unfair behaviour patterns towards consumers; (Schmalensee, 
1973). The same considerations hold in the case of the more general investments in trust and 
reputation. If trust-building policies are based on effective and loyal behaviour (more 
accuracy in testing new products; more ethics in management's choices; and more 
transparency in information diffusion), trust investments are likely to improve welfare. In 
contrast, if trust-building policies are based on unfair practices, such as hiding firms' private 
information on the level of risk or not carrying out effective measures of prevention, trust 
investment can lower social welfare. Thus, when consumer trust is excessive with respect to 
the actual reliability of the trustee actors (retailers and certification bodies in the case of 
private standards and third-party certification), a negative welfare outcome is expected. 
 
Trust can also be excessive with respect to the level of alert and involvement that the civil 
society must keep in order to correct market failures due to asymmetric information and 
public goods. Private economic incentives are not sufficient to assure the optimal supply of 
public goods. The intervention of society, through different form of governance or the 
intervention of the state, are then required. An excessive trust in private sector, and especially 
that kind of trust that makes consumers (and, more generally, citizens) believe in somehow an 
altruistic behaviour of firms and in their real interest in public interest (i.e., the trust fostered 
by social responsibility and sustainable standards), reduces the incentive for such corrective 
intervention and leads to non-optimal market equilibrium. 
 
Excessive trust can be very dangerous in the case of risk control of new technologies. The 
withdrawal of state and civil society leaves the entire onerous of risk assessment and 
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management to the private sector. Since private firms asses risk on the ground of pure private 
economic goals, they do not take into account more general social goals based on ethical and 
political besides economic considerations. Moreover, private firms tend to over valuate 
reputational and legal risks, and to under evaluate actual health and environmental risks, 
especially when these latter affect people in future times and/or at a geographical distance 
(that is the problem of the choice of the discount rate that should reflect preferences of the 
future generations instead of the present ones, and the problem of the environmental costs 
paid by poor countries for the high level of consumptions of affluent societies).  
 
Nano-technologies make up the new technological wave (after the much less revolutionary 
information and genetic engineering technologies) that is going to flood the food sector. 
Notwithstanding the many possible economic, environmental, health, and socio-political risks 
of these technologies (ETC group, 2004; Greenpeace, 2002), regulations are non-existent and 
discussion of the industry's societal impact is barely a whisper. Private and public sectors in 
developed countries are making huge investments in these technologies (with about $10 
billion spent in 2004 on nano-technology research & development), and nano-technology 
products are coming to market at a steady pace. An estimated 475 products containing 
invisible, unregulated, and unlabeled nano-scale particles are already commercially available 
(including food products, pesticides, cosmetics, sunscreens, and many more), and thousands 
more are in the pipeline (ETC group, 2005). Here, really, there is a case where the excess of 
trust in food firms (leading consumers to ingenuously accept any new 'miraculous and 
exciting' product released by the more known and trustee brands, such as Nestlé, Kraft, and 
Budweiser; see note 6) along with a lack of social capital (allowing the civil society to 
consciously chose the level of risk-bearing) can lead to a 'mad' and 'out-of-control' use of new 
technologies. The recommendations made by the ETC Group to civil society and 
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governments in order to comply with the risks of these new technologies well reassume this 
point: "It is urgent that civil society work together to encourage the widest possible public 
discussion of the new nano-scale technologies….. and national governments should establish 
a sui generis regulatory regime specifically designed to address the unique health and 
environmental issues associated with nano-scale materials used in food and agriculture" (ETC 
Group, 2004: p.54). 
 
Concluding this section, trust seems to be a key factor in the spreading process of new 
technologies. For potentially risky products, such as GM and nano-tech products, an excess 
of firm investment in consumer trust can lead to socially negative effects if firms act in a 
totally selfish way (i.e., when there is a lack of ethics). While trust development seems to be a 
successful firm's competitive weapon (more trust, more profits), it is not sure that more trust 
entails higher social welfare. To make trust 'good in any case' two assumptions must hold: 
firms' trust-building policies must involve ethics besides its profit maximization task; and the 
society where markets are embedded must be so rich in social capital as to take part in 
process of risk analysis and regulation setting. 
 
What kind of networks? 
 
As previously noticed, a result of the new procurement system (of which private standards 
and third-party certification are part) is a network with central nodes being made of huge 
retailers and third-party certification firms, secondary node made of non-governmental 
organizations, civil consortium, extension agencies and local governmental agencies, and 
with suppliers around the world insulated at peripherical positions. 
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While the higher interconnection among different actors worldwide could be interpreted as a 
social capital, and thereby a social welfare improvement, this particular network structure 
suggests less favourable social welfare effects. As a matter of fact, it actually looks like the 
kind of small network structure identified by Burt as a successful basis for the exploitation of 
market opportunities by actors located in advantageous positions. In other words, it is a sound 
source of power asymmetry and market imperfection in the system.  
 
With respect to products sensible to health risk, retailers in the new procurement system are 
linked to suppliers through the informative and quality control intermediation of third-party 
certifiers, and are requested no longer to build trustful close relations with loyal suppliers. 
Nevertheless, they can control more strictly the suppliers by dictating standards and terms of 
exchange in a situation where the shift of the burden of specific investments and assurance 
costs to the sole suppliers makes these latter far more locked-in and bargaining powerless in 
the relationship.  
 
Certifiers on their part are important nodes linking a multitude of suppliers to several buyers. 
Suppliers are pushed towards disadvantageous peripherical positions, losing their direct links 
with their final customers and obliged to face horizontal competition with other suppliers 
dispersed throughout the world, and with a less capability of exercising some form of 
countervailing power (Dobson, Waterson, 1997). Among the very connected actors are 
certification bodies at the top of the certification system that are indirectly linked to a huge 
bundle of suppliers and buyers (and also to non-governmental organizations and other civil 
networks when these latter are involved in the process of standard setting) through the many 
certifiers they accredit.  
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The most connected actors are those large retailers joined in project, will use EUREPGAP, 
aimed at setting standards shared by a wide group of buyers and suppliers. In this case, the 
direct links among joined retailers and between these and certification agencies and the 'super 
middlemen' managing relationships with the individual suppliers make a sort of interlocking 
directorate, with all the related possible collusive and anticompetitive effects. In other words, 
third-party certification and the new procurement system give retailers the opportunity to 
exploit two sources of social capital: the social cohesiveness of these new networks (like 
EUREPGAP) leading the chain, and the structural holes associated with the insulation of 
individual suppliers at the periphery of the whole food-supply chain network architecture. 
These facilitate 'union' (i.e., a strategy that creates value by bringing actors together, closing 
the holes between them) and 'disunion' (i.e., a strategy that exploits the structural holes 
between actors by keeping them apart); and will further consolidate the dominant position of 
big retailers within the food-supply chain (Baker and Obstfeld, 1999; see note 7).  
 
As big retailers become central nodes in the network and the total number of links increases, 
the network structure shifts from the small world type to the scale free type, that is networks 
with power-law degree distribution. In contrast to small world networks, the scale-free ones 
display nodes with significantly more links than average. These nodes with an extraordinarily 
large number of links are referred to as hubs. Actors in hub position control most 
opportunities and are the ones able to exploit different sources of power. In economic 
exchange networks a scale-free structure predicts power (Sodano, 2006a) whether because 
hub actors (firms) have a negotiating power higher than that of their attached nodes where 
customers and suppliers are located (according to the prediction of power-dependence 
theory), or because they have access to more sources of competitive advantages (according to 
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the prediction of structural holes theory). Moreover, in the measure to which hub actors can 
forbid the attachment of given nodes, a strategic use of power can also be assumed. 
 
Concluding this section, the new networks shaped up by the new procurement strategies are 
such as to raise the degree of power imbalance in supplier-retail relationships (and also to 
waste trust as a consequence of the overcoming of the relational model of supply chain 
management; see note 8). Notwithstanding the possible benefits stemming from a retailer-
controlled supply chain and the 'natural' tendency towards asymmetry in business-to-business 
relationships (Hingley, 2005), the excess of power in the chain can hamper the efficiency and 
the stability of the system, besides the generally accounted for negative equity effects. Power 
can show up as market power, and then all the inefficiencies of market imperfections occur. 
An excessive imbalance of bargaining power can affect efficiency besides equity when the 
Nash bargaining solution assumption of maximization of joint profit does not hold. When 
power is used as corrective of contract incompleteness instead of trust, the total exchange 
surplus can be lower as well (Sodano, 2006b). When power is fed by information asymmetry, 
the lack of transparency reduces the total system performance (Hofstede, 2005). Too much 
inefficiency reduces the total surplus in the system, lowering profitability and hindering 
investment capacities, with negative effects on innovation and reaction capability to external 
shocks. The loss of trust and cooperation produced by an excess of power limits the total 
capability of the system to cope with the complexity of the external economic, technological, 
institutional and socio-cultural environment. A suboptimal supply of food safety and the 
inability to face unexpected food outbreaks can also be consequences of power excess.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
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The globalization of the agrifood system and the growing variety of food products and 
technologies have made it increasingly difficult for nation states to regulate food safety and 
quality practices, giving rise to a shift from public to private governance, essentially in the 
form of private standards and third-party certification. Standards are a form of regulation. 
They enable a higher degree of global order and facilitate coordination and cooperation on a 
global scale, creating similarities and homogeneity even among peoples and organizations 
that are quite different.  
 
Nevertheless, when the process of standards setting and enforcement is not under the control 
of public democratic bodies, the enhancing welfare effects of standards cannot be taken any 
longer for granted. The extant literature agrees on some  at least potentially  negative 
effects of private standards and third-party certification. These effects include the exclusion 
of small producers from the global supply chain; the lack of transparency and democracy in 
food safety goals setting; the possible lack of reliability of certification bodies; the rise of 
power imbalance in the system; and the negative effects on the upgrading of less developed 
countries.  
 
The most agreed judgment on private standards is that they are a driver of concentration and 
that, along with the new global buyer-driven procurement strategies, they are supporting the 
emergence of transnational supermarkets chains as the most powerful actors in the global 
agrifood system. The development of private standards for safety, quality, and the 
environment seems largely to be the outcome of supermarkets profit maximization strategies 
and concerns over liability, "Consequently, because corporate success is not based on a firm's 
contribution to the public good, it is just likely that there will be a disjuncture, and not a 
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congruence, between the public and the private sphere" (Konefal, Mascarenhas, and 
Hatanaka, 2005: p. 298). 
 
When carrying out the analysis of private regulatory trend through the conceptual category of 
social capital, the various concerns about its welfare effects are confirmed. First, private 
standards and third-party certification are weaker tools, with respect to trust, for correcting 
contract incompleteness stemming by credence-type food safety attributes. Second, the 
excess of trust of consumers in retailers and certification bodies can bias risk analysis 
processes, leading to a suboptimal (with respect the actual social preferences) risk assessment 
and to ineffective risk management policies. Third, the kind of network structure emerging as 
consequence of the new global food chain organization is such as to support a growing power 
imbalance in the system, with the associated negative equity and efficiency outcomes. Fourth, 
social movements and non governmental organization could have an important role in 
mitigating the social negative effects of food safety private regulations; nevertheless their 
strength seems to be jeopardized instead of being promoted by the particular kind of social 
and economic networks produced by the privatization process. 
 
The use of social capital suggests that private standards and third-party certification are not 
merely an impartial technical tool to foster food markets efficiency and safety. Rather they 
are the means by which powerful actors in the chain discipline people and things in order to 
accomplish their own objectives. 
 
Economic sociologists have widely analyzed the meaning of the embeddedness of markets in 
the social texture, showing how the different forms of regulations that stabilize the exchange 
game come from the delicate equilibrium between economic, political, and social behavioural 
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patterns. Safety standards are a kind of rules of exchange. These standards, together with 
property rights, governance structures, and conceptions of control form, rule make structured 
exchanges possible (Fligstein, 2001; see note 9). Rules constituting markets architectures 
emerge from the political game played by the main actors in the systems, as for instance 
government officials, capitalists, workers, and consumers. Describing the ideal market 
regulatory process, Fligstein (2001) identifies different ideal types according to which actor 
dominates the economic-political arena. When capitalists dominate, the state is kept out of 
markets and its intervention is requested only to face incumbent dominant firms' crises. 
Shareholders have all property rights, private firms capture the regulatory control, and 
governance structures give rise to cartel and clear organizations of competitors. Such a 
description reflects well the ongoing process of reorganization of the food supply chain, with 
private standards and third-party certification being one of the rules of exchange built up by 
dominant firms in order to ease their exchange settings, to control suppliers and to thwart 
competitors through the trade barrier effect of standards. 
 
Capturing regulatory activities is advantageous when it seems better for business to voluntary 
take on responsibilities and to be able to exert influence than to risk having public agencies 
set rules or impose laws that might be stricter and less adapted to business practices. The side 
effect, of course, is the progressive divergence between standards and the public goals they 
should help to attain, with unpredictable consequence on the effectiveness of standards in 
assuring a high level of food safety.  
 
A general conclusion is that private food safety regulation can be very different, in scope and 
results, from public regulation. The emergence of one or another depends more on political 
than economic issues and reflects power asymmetries in the society. More research efforts 
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and a wider use of approaches from economic sociology are requested in order to shed light 
on the current organizational and regulatory trends in the food system. 
 
Notes 
 
1: According to the European Communities Act 1972, the case law of the European Court of 
Justice makes clear that it is not open to the member states to retain provisions in national 
legislation in so far as they duplicate, gloss, or conflict with the directly applicable provisions 
of EU Regulation. 
 
2: The Commission gives the member states the mandate to implement enforcement powers 
and penalties in relation to the accomplishment to the EU level-stated food safety obligations.  
 
3: In legally enforced regulations and formal contracts allocation of liability and penalties are 
defined and enforced through the legal system. Incomplete formal contracts and informal 
contracts are not legally enforced, instead they use other forms of enforcement, including 
trust, power, and self-enforcing agreement arrangements.  
 
4: While the warranty defence only requires that buyers prove the food was not compromised 
while under their control, the due diligence requires that they take all 'reasonable steps' to 
ensure the food they receive from upstream suppliers is safe. 
 
5: Management and industrial organisation theories have also looked at trust as a lubricant of 
inter- and intra-firm relationships, but in reality having in mind a form of interpersonal more 
than impersonal trust. For example, when informal relationships, such as 'handshakes' 
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emerge, which is the consequence of interpersonal relationship based on collusive behaviour 
and/or power-dependence constraints. 
 
6: Kraft’s nanotech consortium scientists are developing nanocapsules whose walls burst at 
different microwaves frequencies so that the consumer can switch on new tastes and colours. 
L’Oréal and Nestlé (Nestlé holds a 49% stake in L’Oréal) recently formed the laboratory 
Innéov, a 50/50 joint venture, to develop new nanotech 'cosmetic nutritional supplement'. 
Mars currently coats its M&Ms, Twix, and Skittles brand candies with an inorganic nano-
film that increases the product shelf life (ETC Group, 2004).  
 
7: Baker and Obstfeld (1999) suggest that the institutional context that assures the higher 
social capital access is the one characterised on the one hand by small, dense, and integrated 
networks  where behaviors are based on cooperation, trust, and collectivism – and on the 
other hand by large, sparse, disconnected networks – where behaviours are based on 
competition, opportunism, and individualism. 
 
8: As food safety and quality attributes responsible for the exchange complexity are simply 
codified and enforced through standards and third-party certification, the global value chain 
governance, using the terminology and the analytical framework suggested by Gereffi (2003), 
shifts from the relational type to the captive type, where both the power asymmetry and the 
explicit coordination by the leading party are higher. 
 
9: Property rights are rules that define who have claims on the profits of firms. Governance 
structures refer to the general rules in a society that define relations of competition and 
cooperation and how firms should be organised. Rules of exchange define who can transact 
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and the conditions under which transactions are carried out. Conceptions of control reflect 
market-specific agreements between actors in firms on principles of internal organization, 
and the hierarchy or status ordering of firms in a given markets (Flingstein, 2001). 
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Table 1. Food safety regulation framework in the European Union 
Third international level 
(non-statutory 
intervention) 
  
 Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health 
Organization setting goals and guidelines 
 International agencies supplying informative and operative 
support 
Second international 
level (non-statutory 
intervention) 
 Codex, suggesting guidelines and advices 
 Certification bodies (accreditation of certifiers) 
First international level 
(statutory intervention) 
 The World Trade Organization, statutory advices, and trade 
rules agreements 
EU level (statutory and 
non-statutory 
intervention) 
 Regulation (minimum standards on residues, additives, and 
microbiological contamination; hazard analysis and critical 
control point; labeling)  
 Directives (standards, labeling, hazard analysis and critical 
control point) 
 Guidelines (planning and defining goals and procedures) 
 Certification bodies (accreditation of private certifiers) 
 Food Safety Agency (task of coordination, procedure settings, 
information, risk analysis) 
National level (statutory 
intervention) 
 Laws implementing directives from the European Union 
 Enforcement powers (allocation of liability and penalties) 
 National certification bodies 
Subnational level 
(statutory intervention) 
 Local laws and policies 
Private level (non-
statutory intervention) 
 Private standards and third party certification 
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Table 2. Food safety policy: public and private tools 
Public tools that are enforced by the legal 
system 
Private tools that are enforced by implicit 
contracts (reputation) or by formal assurance 
contracts and third party certification 
 Minimum quality standards 
 Mandatory hazard analysis and critical 
control point 
 Labeling 
 Mandatory traceability 
 Product liability 
 Reputation 
 Standard and quality certification 
 Voluntary traceability 
 Voluntary hazard analysis and critical 
control point 
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Figure 1. Two social capital perspectives 
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